Flirting With the Law: An Analysis of the \u3ci\u3eEllerth/Faragher\u3c/i\u3e Circuit Split and a Prediction of the Seventh Circuit’s Stance by Neals, Natalie S
Marquette Law Review
Volume 97
Issue 1 Fall 2013 Article 7
Flirting With the Law: An Analysis of the Ellerth/
FaragherCircuit Split and a Prediction of the
Seventh Circuit’s Stance
Natalie S. Neals
n.s.neals@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Natalie S. Neals, Flirting With the Law: An Analysis of the Ellerth/Faragher Circuit Split and a Prediction of the Seventh Circuit’s Stance, 97
Marq. L. Rev. 167 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol97/iss1/7
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 88 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 88 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013 1:59 PM 
 
FLIRTING WITH THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE ELLERTH/FARAGHER CIRCUIT 
SPLIT AND A PREDICTION OF THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S STANCE 
This Comment critically analyzes the split in the circuits over the 
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.  Further, this Comment 
predicts how the Seventh Circuit will rule on this split.  The 
Ellerth/Faragher defense is an affirmative defense available to employers 
who would otherwise be held liable for their supervisors’ harassing acts in 
hostile work environment situations.  There are two prongs to the defense: 
(1) “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and (2) “the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”  Some courts drop the second prong of the defense in single-
incident cases of harassment, arguing that the affirmative defense is fact 
specific, impermissibly imposes strict liability in single-incident cases, and 
is unfair to employers.  This Comment suggests that the Seventh Circuit 
will affirmatively apply both prongs of the defense in all situations based 
on its adherence to precedent, trends in the lower courts, and its rationale 
in another recent circuit split.  Further, this Comment argues that the 
application of both prongs of the defense is the correct standard 
regardless of the length of time of the harassment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At 9 a.m., at the beginning of a normal workday in January 2008, Ms. 
Annastacia Alalade was assaulted by her supervisor at work.1  Ms. 
Alalade worked for AWS Assistance Corporation (AWS) as a trainer, 
feeding and giving medication to the residents at a group home.2  She 
had worked under the supervision of Mr. Sam Ntawanda, without 
incident, until January 21.3  Suddenly, that day, Mr. Ntawanda followed 
Ms. Alalade into a pantry and physically and sexually assaulted her.4  
Mr. Ntawanda, a supervisor that Ms. Alalade’s employer trusted enough 
to place in a position of authority, grabbed her, pushed her against the 
pantry wall, unzipped her pants and removed her belt, kissed her, and 
touched her inappropriately.5  During this incident, Ms. Alalade pleaded 
for him to stop and tried to fight him away.6 
Ultimately, Ms. Alalade escaped from the pantry and locked herself 
in a bathroom, but her trauma did not end there.7  Although Ms. 
Alalade made a formal report to her employer, there was very little 
follow-up and she got the impression that no one believed her.8  Ms. 
Alalade decided to pursue formal charges against her employer and 
filed a charge of discrimination in the Northern District of Indiana on 
June 19, 2008.9  AWS subsequently argued (1) that the single incident of 
harassment she experienced was not severe enough to constitute hostile 
work environment harassment and (2) employers in single-incident 
cases should be entitled to a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in which 
only the first prong is applied, such that employers with a valid anti-
harassment policy who promptly respond to reports of harassment are 
shielded from liability.10 
Sex harassment11 is still a very current and problematic issue—as 
 
1. The Videotaped Dep. of Annastacia Alalade at 24:8, 29:7–9, 30:3–9, 30:15, Alalade v. 
AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (No. 3:09-CV-338). 
2. The Videotaped Dep. of Annastacia Alalade, supra note 1 at 9:12–13, 12:10–13. 
3. Id. at 14:1–3, 24:5–9, 24:19–22. 
4. Id. at 30:2–15, 31:10–16. 
5. Id. at 30:3–9, 30:15, 31:10–16, 31:25, 32:1–13. 
6. Id. at 32:7–15. 
7. Id. at 32:17–18. 
8. Id. at 41:21–23, 46:16–18. 
9. Def’s Ex. No. A, Charge of Discrimination, Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. 
Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (No. 3:09-CV-338). 
10. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937–38. 
11. Sex (or sexual) harassment is a subset of illegal sexual discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL 
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evidenced above.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) reported that the highest number of workplace discrimination 
claims of all time were brought in 2011, with sex discrimination claims 
making up almost twenty-nine percent of all claims.12  Of the sex 
discrimination claims filed and resolved under Title VII in 2011, 11,364 
(approximately forty percent) were sexual harassment claims.13  Within 
this category, supervisory harassment issues14 comprise a significant 
number of the cases that circuit courts see each year.15  Over a five-year 
period, the eleven circuit courts and the D.C. Circuit reviewed a total of 
126 supervisory sexual harassment cases.16  Yet the question of when 
employers are liable for supervisory harassment remains a contested 
area of sex harassment law.  The Supreme Court seemingly settled this 
issue when it established a two-pronged affirmative defense to employer 
liability in the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth17 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,18 (hereinafter the “Ellerth/Faragher 
defense”) but there is still disagreement among the circuits concerning 
 
HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR 
EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 4 (1999).  Actionable sex harassment can take two forms: 
quid pro quo or hostile work environment.  Id. at 17; Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr., Title VII: Legal 
Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 20 AKRON L. REV. 375, 380 (1987).  Quid pro quo 
harassment is the “conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors.”  Marinelli, supra, 
at 380.  Employers are strictly liable for supervisory quid pro quo harassment.  ACHAMPONG, 
supra, at 21.  The focus of this Comment is on the liability of employers in instances of hostile 
work environment harassment. 
12. Charge Statistics FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/stat 
istics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).  In 2011, there were 99,947 
individual charges filed and 28,534 sex discrimination charges filed.  Id. 
13. Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997 – FY 2011, 
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2013). 
14. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the definition of “supervisor” for Title VII 
purposes is a person who “is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment 
actions against the victim.”  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).  Thus, a 
person is a supervisor for purposes of Title VII liability when the person has the power of 
“hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign[ing] with significantly different responsibilities, or 
[making] a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”  Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).  Otherwise, a harasser is a coworker.  
Whether the harasser is a supervisor or a coworker changes the standard of liability for the 
employer.  See infra Part IV.C for more information on this topic. 
15. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210–11 (2004). 
16. Id. at 210–11, 273 (the period was from June 26, 1998 to June 30, 2003).  Of this total, 
thirteen of the cases were in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Id. at 272. 
17. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
18. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 807 (1998). 
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the application of the second prong of the defense.19 
There are certain instances in which an employer can be liable for its 
supervisor’s illegal harassing conduct.20  This test is laid out in the twin 
cases of Ellerth and Faragher.21  Specifically, to avoid liability, the 
employer must prove (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and promptly correct issues of harassment and (2) that the employee 
unreasonably failed to report the harassment or otherwise take 
advantage of an employer’s preventative measures.22  A straightforward 
reading of this defense suggests that in any situation, an employer can 
successfully invoke the affirmative defense only if the employee-victim 
failed to report the harassment without justification.23  However, this is 
where the circuit split arises. 
Some courts have held that the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense is inapplicable in single incidents of sex harassment, as AWS 
argued in its response, discussed above.  These courts hold that 
employers must prove only the first prong of the defense in order to 
prevail when there has been a single, severe incident of harassment.24  
Generally, these courts use three arguments to justify applying a 
modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident cases: (1) the 
factual differences between their cases and the Ellerth and Faragher 
cases, (2) the need to avoid strict liability in applying the defense, and 
(3) the desire for fairness to employers.25  On the other hand, some 
courts refuse to drop the second prong of the defense in any 
circumstances.26  These courts argue that the language of the defense is 
clear; there is no indication from the Supreme Court that a separate test 
should be applied in single incidents of harassment; and that the defense 
can serve to reduce damages to the employer, thereby making it more 
fair.27 
This Comment will explore the circuit split over the second prong of 
 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
21. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
22. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
23. See L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 717 (2007); G. Roger King, Sexual Harassment Claims in the 
New Millennium: A Litigator’s Point of View, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 539, 548 (2001).  
24. See infra Part III.A. 
25. See infra Part III.A. 
26. See infra Part III.B. 
27. See infra Part III.B. 
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the affirmative defense to employer liability, hypothesize how the 
Seventh Circuit will decide this issue, and argue whether this is the 
correct approach.  Part II of this Comment overviews Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the federal prohibition on employment 
discrimination), the Supreme Court’s recognition of hostile work 
environment harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,28 and 
the Ellerth and Faragher cases that led to the affirmative defense to 
employer liability for supervisor harassment. 
Part III of this Comment delves into the circuit split over the two-
pronged Ellerth/Faragher defense.  It looks first at the rationale of 
courts that have dropped the second prong and then at the rationale of 
courts that have refused to do so.  It concludes with a case study of 
Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.,29 an opinion from a district court 
within the Seventh Circuit—a circuit that has not yet decided on the 
circuit split one way or the other. 
Part IV of this Comment hypothesizes how the Seventh Circuit will 
decide this issue.  It argues that the Seventh Circuit will likely continue 
to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense as established by 
the Supreme Court in all instances.  This prediction is based on the 
Seventh Circuit’s history of adherence to binding Supreme Court 
precedent, the trend in Seventh Circuit district court decisions regarding 
the split, and an analogy to the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in another 
relevant circuit split30 over the definition of “supervisor” for Title VII 
purposes. 
Finally, Part V of this Comment argues that it is the correct decision 
to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all cases.  The 
Supreme Court crafted a straightforward and workable defense that 
considers both the employer and employee’s interests.  Although some 
courts argue that it is not fair for employers to be held liable in single-
incident cases of harassment solely because the employee reported the 
harassment, the reality is that the Supreme Court anticipated this exact 
result.  Whether harassment occurs one time or on an ongoing basis, the 
rule forces employers to take responsibility for harassment in their 
workplaces.  Additionally, this result is justified because employers are 
not innocent in hiring and promoting harassers to the position of 
supervisor, especially in comparison to the truly innocent employee-
 
28. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
29. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
30. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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victims.  Moreover, the second prong of the defense serves an important 
purpose of providing a check on the practicality of the employer’s anti-
harassment policy mandated by the first prong of the defense. 
II. TITLE VII, MERITOR, AND THE CREATION OF THE 
ELLERTH/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination, including discrimination based on sex.31  After Title VII’s 
enactment, it was unclear to many courts whether workplace sexual 
harassment qualified as actionable discrimination under Title VII.32  The 
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson33 answered in 
the affirmative: sexual harassment is actionable when it is quid pro quo 
or creates a hostile work environment.34  Meritor suggested that 
employers may be liable for the harassing acts of their supervisors but 
failed to establish exactly what the standard for liability was.  This 
question was ultimately decided by the Court in Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth35 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.36  In short, 
employers are liable for supervisory harassment in hostile work 
environment cases, subject to the availability of an affirmative defense.37 
A. Title VII and the Meritor Backdrop 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an “unlawful 
employment practice” for any employer to discriminate against an 
employee or a potential employee because of that person’s sex.38  
Specifically, an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
32. See Marinelli, supra note 11, at 377–78 (“The initial district court decisions almost 
uniformly rejected sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII because of fear of 
widespread and friv[o]lous litigation. . . .  The early cases viewed sexual harassment as a 
‘personal’ dispute and gave little weight to the employment context within which the sexual 
harassment took place.” (footnote omitted)). 
33. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57. 
34. Id. at 66.  See also supra note 11 for a definition of quid pro quo harassment and see 
infra note 52 and accompanying text for the elements of a prima facie hostile work 
environment case. 
35. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
36. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
37. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. 807. 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
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employment” based on that person’s sex.39  The congressional intent of 
Title VII is two-fold: to deter discriminatory activity and to compensate 
the victims of discrimination.40 
The landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson41 
interpreted Title VII to determine that hostile work environment sexual 
harassment, in addition to quid pro quo harassment, is an actionable 
claim under Title VII.42  In Meritor, Vinson was a bank teller who 
suffered ongoing harassment from her direct supervisor.43  Vinson 
maintained that she eventually agreed to an ongoing sexual relationship 
with her supervisor because she was afraid of being fired.44  Ultimately, 
Vinson brought a Title VII claim of sexual harassment against her 
employer, Meritor Savings Bank, yielding mixed results from the district 
court and the court of appeals.45 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed Vinson’s claim on the grounds that the sexual relationship 
with her supervisor was voluntary; thus, there was no Title VII 
violation.46  The court opined that even if there had been a violation of 
Title VII, Vinson’s employer would not have been liable to Vinson 
because it had no knowledge of the alleged harassment.47  The Court of 
 
39. Id. 
40. John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The 
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory 
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1407 
(2002). 
41. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
42. Id. at 65–66 (“[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that 
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”).  The first 
case from a lower court to recognize a hostile work environment claim was Rogers v. EEOC, 
454 F.2d 234, 237–38 (5th Cir. 1971).  In contrast, quid pro quo harassment occurs when an 
employer “require[s] sexual consideration from an employee . . . for job benefits.”  Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900, 908, 912-13 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding quid pro quo 
harassment when a supervisor prevented an employee from attending the police academy 
unless she would engage in a sexual relationship with him). 
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59–60.  Vinson’s supervisor reportedly touched her 
inappropriately, followed her into the bathroom, and “forcibly raped her on several 
occasions.”  Id at 60. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 60–62. 
46. Id. at 61–62 (explaining that Vinson “was not the victim of sexual 
harassment . . . while employed at the bank.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47. Id. at 62 (“After noting the bank’s express policy against discrimination, and finding 
that neither respondent nor any other employee had ever lodged a complaint about sexual 
harassment by [the supervisor], the court ultimately concluded that the bank was without 
notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of [the supervisor].” (internal 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit completely disagreed.48  
The court of appeals held that Vinson had a clear case of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment and that employers should be strictly 
liable for any supervisory sexual harassment that occurs in their 
workplaces.49 
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that hostile 
work environment sexual harassment claims are valid grounds on which 
to bring a suit.50  Thus, the Court in Meritor held that a hostile work 
environment arises when there is unwelcome sexual behavior that is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment 
and create[s] an abusive working environment.”51  To establish a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) [t]he plaintiff 
was a member of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to 
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the unwelcome sexual 
conduct was based on sex; [and] (4) the conduct affected a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment.”52  Ultimately, the Court 
remanded Meritor for a complete factual finding consistent with these 
elements.53 
The Court in Meritor recognized that there may be instances in 
which an employer is vicariously liable for the sexual harassment of its 
employees, but failed to establish exactly when that liability attaches.54  
The Court rejected theories of mere negligence or strict liability on their 
own, stating that employers should not always be “automatically liable 
 
quotation marks omitted)). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 62–63 (“[T]he Court of Appeals held that an employer is absolutely liable for 
sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or 
should have known about the misconduct.”). 
50. Id. at 65–66.  The Court based its opinion in large part on the EEOC Guidelines 
from 1980 that said the same.  Id.  EEOC Guidelines have particularly persuasive force in 
discrimination litigation.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (recognizing 
that the EEOC’s interpretation is entitled to “great deference”); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (recognizing “the principle of 
deference to administrative interpretations”).  The Supreme Court has held that 
“interpretations and opinions” of an administrative agency are relevant because they 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–68; ACHAMPONG, supra note 11, at 41. 
52. ACHAMPONG, supra note 11, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
53. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.  The D.C. Circuit remanded Meritor without further 
comment.  Vinson v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (unpublished table opinion). 
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
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for sexual harassment by their supervisors,” yet “absence of notice to an 
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability.”55  
But because Meritor was the first Supreme Court case to recognize a 
claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment and the specific 
factual elements had not been litigated thus far in the case, the Court 
remanded the case without issuing a standard for employer liability.56  
This incomplete standard left lower courts in disarray.57  Following 
Meritor, the majority of courts tended to hold employers liable based on 
a negligence standard unless the harassment was quid pro quo by a 
supervisor, in which case the employer would be vicariously liable.58  
Yet, there was disagreement over exactly why this was the correct 
practice.  The Supreme Court acknowledged this confusion and 
established what it hoped to be a “uniform and predictable standard”59 
in the landmark Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth60 and Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton61 cases.  Although these cases were not initially 
brought together, the Court treated them as twin cases and issued their 
opinions, identical in many important respects, on the same day.62 
B. The Ellerth/Faragher Defense 
The issue of employer liability in supervisory harassment cases came 
to a head in the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth63 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.64  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in both cases in order to settle the circuit split over when employers are 
liable for supervisory harassment.65  The Supreme Court could not 
impose a strict liability standard for employers because such a standard 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 72–73. 
57. Michael C. Harper & Joan Flynn, The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common Lawmaking for the Modern Age, in 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 225, 226 (Joel WM. Friedman ed., 2006).  This 
disarray was exemplified in the Seventh Circuit’s handling of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, which resulted in eight different opinions and “200-plus pages” in the Federal 
Reporter from the justices.  Id. 
58. See id. at 237. 
59. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). 
60. Id. at 742.  
61. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
62. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 225. 
63. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. 
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775. 
65. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753; Faragher at 780, 785–86. 
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was barred by its holding in Meritor, but the Court felt that the standard 
should be something more than negligence.66  To that end, the Supreme 
Court created a two-pronged affirmative defense in an attempt to 
balance the competing interests of employers and employees in 
supervisory harassment suits.67 
Both Ellerth and Faragher were Title VII sexual harassment suits 
involving ongoing supervisory harassment.68  In Ellerth, the plaintiff 
claimed that her supervisor had constantly subjected her to offensive 
and sexual remarks and on one occasion had touched her knee in an 
invasive manner.69  Burlington’s employee handbook contained a policy 
regarding anti-harassment procedures, but Ellerth did not think that the 
policy was ever enforced nor did she know to whom to complain.70  
Ellerth did not inform her employer about the harassment and resigned 
from her position after a year.71 
Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Faragher suffered 
ongoing harassment for five years during her job as a lifeguard for the 
Boca Raton Parks and Recreation Department.72  Two of Faragher’s 
immediate supervisors made offensive comments about her physical 
attractiveness, touched her without invitation, and simulated lewd 
gestures in front of her.73  Although the City maintained a sexual 
harassment policy, it failed to properly disseminate it throughout the 
Parks and Recreation Department in which Faragher worked.74  
Faragher ultimately quit her job without formally reporting the 
harassment.75 
In both cases, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining when 
 
66. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 763–64; Faragher 524 U.S. at 791–92. 
67. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
68. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–49; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748.  The harasser was not Ellerth’s immediate supervisor; 
however, Ellerth’s direct supervisor reported to the harasser, and the harasser had the 
authority to make employment decisions regarding the hiring and firing of employees.  Id. at 
747. 
70. Id. at 749; Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 234. 
71. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48. 
72. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
73. Id. at 782.  Women were the minority on the lifeguarding staff at this time, 
numbering only four to six, and these two supervisors had harassed each of them at one point.  
Id.; Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 228. 
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781–82. 
75. Id. at 780, 782.  Unfortunately for Faragher’s supervisors, she continued on to Case 
Western Reserve University Law School.  Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 228. 
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an employer should be liable for the harassing actions of its 
supervisors.76  The Court first looked to Meritor for guidance.77  Meritor 
suggested that Congress intended the Court to use agency law as a 
guiding principle in formulating employer liability because Congress had 
used the word “agent” in the definition of employer under Title VII.78  
Keeping in mind that Meritor stood for the proposition that employers 
are not strictly liable for supervisory harassment, the Supreme Court 
then turned to the Restatement (Second) of Agency.79  
The Supreme Court looked specifically to section 219 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, entitled “When Master is Liable for 
Torts of His Servants.”80  Generally under the Restatement, an employer 
is not liable for the torts of its employees unless the torts are committed 
within the scope of employment.81  The Court stated that sexual 
harassment is not usually done within the scope of employment, so it 
looked further to the exceptions found in section 219.82  Under section 
219, an employer can incur vicarious liability for tortious employee 
actions committed outside the scope of employment when “(a) the 
master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was 
negligent or reckless, or . . . (d) the servant . . . was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”83  Thus, 
an employer is strictly liable for its supervisor’s actions if the harassment 
was a result of the employer’s own tortious intent or that of a high-
 
76. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.  Ironically enough, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Ellerth not to determine the issue of liability, but to resolve 
whether a claim of sexual harassment could stand without a tangible employment action 
taken against the employee.  Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 240.  However, the oral 
argument opened and closed with discussion on the issue of liability, and the majority of the 
oral argument hour was spent on liability as well.  Id.  It is clear from the two opinions that 
the justices were really deciding the issue of liability, not whether hostile work environment 
could stand as a claim without a tangible employment action.  Id. at 242. 
77. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 
(1986)); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72). 
78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791. 
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805. 
80. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).  The scope of employment 
rule requires that employees are acting with the purpose of furthering the employer’s business 
goals.  See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70:505 (5th ed. 1984)). 
82. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757–58 (stating that supervisory harassment is usually done for 
“personal motives”). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a)–(d). 
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ranking employee acting as a proxy.84  Additionally, an employer is 
vicariously liable under the Restatement if the employer acted 
negligently—if it knew or should have known about a hostile work 
environment and failed to take action—or if the tortious act could not 
have been committed but for the agency relationship.85 
Thus, the Court was at a crossroads.  It appreciated the benefits 
offered by the potentially expansive theories of direct and vicarious 
liability but was restrained by its holding in Meritor that employers 
should not be strictly liable for supervisory harassment.  Additionally, 
the Court recognized that negligence was merely a “minimum 
standard,” and as the plaintiff in Ellerth urged, Title VII demanded a 
more stringent liability standard.86  The Court compromised between the 
theories of vicarious liability and negligence in holding that employers 
are vicariously liable, subject to an affirmative defense, in instances of 
hostile work environment supervisory harassment when there was no 
tangible employment action (such as termination) taken against the 
employee.87  The defense provides that if an employer can prove by a 
 
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (a); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59; 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793. 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b)–(d); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59.  
The Court seemed persuaded by the argument that the harassment could not have been 
committed without the agency relationship, thus imputing vicarious liability on the employers, 
but it recognized its limitation in that every plaintiff in every case could argue that the 
harassment would not have occurred but for the supervisor being employed by the employer.  
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Marks, supra note 40, at 1418 (noting that the Court believed that this 
theory gave good support for imposing vicarious liability on the employer based on the fact 
that “an employer selects and trains its supervisory personnel, . . . confers upon supervisors a 
status imbued with a special capacity and opportunity to harass subordinates, and an 
employer can monitor supervisors more directly”). 
86. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
87. Id. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite 
Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 695 (2000); 
Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for 
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 529, 553–54 (2006).  Both the Ellerth and Faragher opinions “commanded 
strong majorities” with only two justices dissenting.  Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 241.  
Inexplicably, Justice Ginsburg joined in the majority in Faragher but merely concurred in 
judgment in Ellerth.  Id.; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that she, 
Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Court’s holding and rule of liability).  The two Justices who 
dissented in both cases were Justices Thomas and Scalia.  Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 
241.  Justice Thomas took issue with the fact that the Court seemed to be engaging in 
policymaking and formulating a rule out of “whole cloth.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 250.  He believed that the majority 
completely misread section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and had 
consequently created an “unjustified symmetry” in the area of sex discrimination law that was 
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preponderance of the evidence “two necessary elements,” it can avoid 
“liability or damages.”88  The employer must prove “that [it] exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior” and “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by 
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”89 
The defense incorporates “the agency principle of vicarious liability 
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority,” the twin aims of 
Title VII (deterrence and compensation), and a measure of 
reasonableness.90  The first prong reflects the negligence principle and 
speaks directly to employer reasonableness by requiring employers to 
promptly “prevent and correct” supervisory harassment.91  This 
requirement encourages employers to adopt formal policies against 
harassment that incorporate a grievance procedure and resolution 
system.92  These policies often demand prompt remedial employer action 
upon a report of sexual harassment.93  The second prong speaks to 
employee reasonableness and the tort principle of avoidable 
consequences.94  Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, many circuits stated that 
employers should not be held liable for harassment that they did not 
know about.95  Thus, the second prong of the defense requires that 
employees formally report harassment in order to provide notice to 
their employers about problems in their workplaces.96  In general, the 
defense works to “encourag[e] preventative action by both the employer 
and employee.”97 
The Court applied the newly-formed Ellerth/Faragher defense in 
 
not paralleled elsewhere in Title VII.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 772–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 241.  Somewhat forebodingly, Justice Thomas predicted 
that this rule would open the floodgates of litigation and criticized the rule for failing to 
clarify the law.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 774 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“There will be more and 
more litigation to clarify applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitioners and the 
courts have long been begging for guidance.”). 
88. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
89. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
90. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
91. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
92. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 714–15; Murr, supra note 87, at 555–57. 
93. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 714–15; Murr, supra note 87, at 556–57. 
94. Marks, supra note 40, at 1421; see also Murr, supra note 87, at 609–11. 
95. King, supra note 23, at 543. 
96. Hébert, supra note 23, at 717.  
97. Marks, supra note 40, at 1421. 
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Faragher and found in favor of the plaintiff.98  The Court held that the 
City of Boca Raton could not meet the first prong of the defense 
because it did not sufficiently disseminate its sexual harassment policy, 
thereby failing to exercise the requisite reasonable care that would 
entitle it to the affirmative defense.99  On the other hand, Ellerth was 
remanded to the district court for further factual findings and to allow 
the employer an opportunity to raise the affirmative defense.100  
Although Faragher exemplifies a straightforward application of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense, certain circuit courts have since interpreted 
and applied the second prong of the defense in such a way as to dash the 
Supreme Court’s dreams of establishing a “uniform and predictable” 
standard in this area of law.101 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE SECOND PRONG 
Although some consider the two-pronged Ellerth/Faragher defense 
“straightforward”102 and “simple,”103 the second prong of the defense 
alone has managed to cause a split of opinion between various circuit 
courts.104  The two prongs of the defense are (1) an employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct instances of sexual 
harassment and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to utilize the 
employer’s corrective mechanisms or to otherwise avoid harm.105  The 
defense has become controversial because some courts have 
inconsistently applied the second prong, most commonly dropping it in 
cases of single-incident or rapid-onset hostile work environment 
harassment.106  Other courts hold firm to the notion that the 
 
98. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).  
99. Id. 
100. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998).  Harper and Flynn noted 
that because Ellerth did not use her employer’s corrective mechanism as required under the 
defense, her likelihood of success was low on remand; however, there is not a further record 
of the case.  Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 245–46. 
101. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754; see also infra Part III.A. 
102. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Indest v. 
Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest II), 168 F.3d 795, 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring)). 
103. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Ind. 2011); 
Marks, supra note 40, at 1404. 
104. See Rachel Shachter, Note, Creating Equitable Outcomes Through Remedies: When 
Reasonable Employers Must Be Held Liable for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 8 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 567 (2001) (“Despite the clear structure of the two-pronged test, some 
federal courts have determined that the second prong is optional.”). 
105. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
106. See infra Part III.A. 
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Ellerth/Faragher defense applies in all cases of supervisor hostile work 
environment harassment where there was no tangible employment 
action.107  The Seventh Circuit remains silent on this issue, as noted in 
Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.108 
A. Courts That Have Dropped the Second Prong 
A number of courts have applied a modified Ellerth/Faragher 
defense in certain instances.  Generally, a modified Ellerth/Faragher 
defense is one in which a court applies only the first prong and drops the 
second prong.109  In other words, the courts look at whether the 
employer has acted reasonably with regard to preventative and 
corrective procedures in the sexual harassment context, but ignore 
whether the employee has acted similarly reasonable or otherwise 
attempted to avoid harm.  Consequently, an employer is not liable 
under a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense if it “promptly exercise[s] 
reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing 
behavior.”110 
Most commonly, the second prong is dropped in single-incident or 
rapid-onset cases.111  Single-incident cases are situations where there is 
one single occurrence of harassment, often very severe, as contrasted 
with ongoing harassment that lasts for a longer period of time.112  Rapid-
onset harassment is generally understood as a sudden, serious instance 
of harassment that could not have been prevented because there was no 
 
107. See infra Part III.B.  Hereinafter, when this Comment refers to “all cases of 
supervisor hostile work environment harassment,” readers should interpret this as referring 
to instances in which there was no tangible employment action taken against the employee, 
because if there was, strict liability attaches, and the question of employer liability is moot.  
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 (1986). 
108. See infra Part III.C. 
109. Marks, supra note 40, at 1404 (describing the modified defense as one in which the 
courts read “the word ‘and’ between the two prongs of the defense [as] mean[ing] ‘or’ in 
[certain] cases”). 
110. John C. Ayres, Note, Is It Sexual Harassment or Not? The Single Incident 
Exception, 71 MO. L. REV. 205, 208 (2006). 
111. Marks, supra note 40, at 1423.  
112. See id. at 1423 n.124.  However, at least in the Eighth Circuit, it appears that a 
single incident does not necessarily mean one occurrence, but could include harassment that 
happens in one fell swoop, such as all in one day or evening.  See McCurdy v. Ark. State 
Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004).  One commentator has noted that in McCurdy, the court 
categorized the case as a single-incident case by considering “the five or six acts of alleged 
sexual harassment by [the supervisor] on July 5, 2002, as a single incident.”  Ayres, supra note 
110, at 217.  For more instances of courts that have blurred the single-incident/rapid-onset 
line, see infra note 304. 
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lead-up to the incident.113  Currently, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth 
Circuits use a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident or 
rapid-onset cases.114  In addition, a Ninth Circuit district court and Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits’ non-precedential opinions have also endorsed 
this viewpoint.115  In these cases, courts generally give three reasons for 
deviating from the traditional Ellerth/Faragher defense: (1) the factual 
differences between the Ellerth and Faragher cases and the case before 
it; (2) the necessity of avoiding strict liability as was prohibited in 
Meritor; (3) and the desire for fairness towards employers who have 
done everything in their power to avoid workplace harassment.116 
1. Factual Differences 
Many courts that deviate from a strict application of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense do so because of perceived factual distinctions 
between the cases that inspired the defense and the cases presently in 
front of the court.  Specifically, these courts note that in Burlington 
 
113. Marks, supra note 40, at 1404.  There is no clear distinction between the definitions 
of single-incident and rapid-onset, and they seem similar in many respects.  Additionally, one 
court has described the full Ellerth/Faragher defense as inapplicable to “incipient” cases.  
Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest I), 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J.).  
Although the definition of “incipient” is unclear, it seems to mean a sudden and unavoidable 
exposure to a hostile work environment to which a plaintiff promptly complains, or an “early-
stage hostile work-environment claim.”  Charles W. Garrison, Comment, Once Is Enough: 
The Need to Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense in Single Incident and 
Incipient Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1131, 
1146 (2012); see also Marks, supra note 40, at 1423. 
114. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762; Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614 
*1 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion). 
115. See EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5–6 (D. N. 
Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011); Indest I, 164 F.3d at 265–66; Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 
1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring specially). 
116. The arguments boil down to these three rationales, although they are admittedly 
intertwined (e.g., some courts may think that the defense is unfair to employers because it 
imposes strict liability).  A fourth potential argument was advanced by a district court in the 
Eighth Circuit and relates to the construction of the defense as a whole.  Some courts read the 
“and” in the Ellerth/Faragher as an “or.”  See, e.g., Keefer v. Universal Forest Products, Inc., 
73 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 1999).  In Keefer, the court questioned the applicability of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in a single-incident case where the supervisor allegedly forced the 
plaintiff to remain in a shed with him for two hours, during which, he allegedly begged the 
plaintiff to have sex with him.  Id. at 1055–56.  After citing relevant portions of Ellerth and 
Faragher that establish the affirmative defense, the court suggested that “[a]lthough the 
[defense] uses the conjunctive ‘and,’ it appears from the surrounding discussion that either of 
these elements can be proved in order to establish the defense.”  Id. at 1055 n.2. 
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Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth117 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,118 the 
employees had been victims of ongoing harassment.119  Because of these 
factual distinctions, these courts reason that the Supreme Court 
intended the Ellerth/Faragher defense to apply only to similar factual 
scenarios.120 
For example, the Eighth Circuit confronted the issue of single-
incident sexual harassment and invoked the factual distinction argument 
in order to apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in McCurdy v. 
Arkansas State Police.121  McCurdy worked as a radio dispatcher for the 
Arkansas State Police.122  During one shift, a sergeant entered the 
dispatch room and made comments about McCurdy’s body and her 
attractiveness, hugged her, and touched her breasts.123  McCurdy 
reported the events to another sergeant—the highest-ranking official on 
duty that night—when the sergeant arrived for work a few hours later.124  
Although the fact that McCurdy reported the harassment to a superior 
would in principle preclude her employer from successfully using the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the employer.125 
The court justified its deviation from the full defense by noting that 
the Supreme Court had considered issues of repeated harassment in 
Ellerth and Faragher while McCurdy’s harassment was a single 
incident.126  The court stated that “[j]udicially adopted defenses should 
not be viewed in a vacuum and blindly applied to all future cases,” and 
held that the use of the Ellerth/Faragher defense would be inappropriate 
based on the “unique facts” of the case.127  To the court, applying the 
 
117. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
118. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
120. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest 
I, 164 F.3d at 265. 
121. McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762.  For an in-depth look at this case, see Ayres, supra note 
110. 
122. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 764. 
123. Id. at 764–65. 
124. Id. at 765. 
125. Id. at 771–74. 
126. Id. at 771 (“In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court confronted cases involving 
repeated incidents of supervisor sexual harassment.  In contrast, we are confronted with 
McCurdy’s case involving a single incident of alleged supervisor sexual harassment.”). 
127. Id.  Another case from the Eighth Circuit specifically noted that the defense was 
“adopted in cases that involved ongoing sexual harassment.”  Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 
175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999).  Thus, the court suggested that a plaintiff will never recover 
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defense would be “like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole” 
because of the distinct factual differences.128   
An additional factual difference some courts look to is whether the 
plaintiff reported the harassment.  The employees in Ellerth and 
Faragher never reported being harassed.129  In many cases where courts 
apply a modified defense, the employees utilized the employer’s 
harassment policy and the employer quickly and remedially responded 
to their complaints.130  For example, in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, 
Inc. (Indest I),131 the vice-president of the plaintiff’s employer made 
“crude sexual comments and sexual gestures” to her on four separate 
occasions over the course of a weeklong convention.132  The plaintiff 
reported these incidents to her director and the branch office manager, 
who escalated the issue to a human resources director before the week’s 
end.133  Although the court did not decide whether the harassment rose 
to the level of an actionable hostile work environment claim, it held that 
Indest’s claim failed nonetheless because there was no basis for 
employer liability.134  The court held that the defense did not control in 
this case based on the factual variances from Ellerth and Faragher, and 
instead, the employer should be rewarded for taking swift action to 
remedy the situation and for potentially impeding the creation of a 
 
“for any initial act of harassment as long as the employer subsequently responds.”  Grossman, 
supra note 87, at 714. 
128. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 771. 
129. See supra notes 71, 75 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000).  In 
Jaudon, the plaintiff alleged that her transportation coordinator had followed her into the 
restroom and looked over the stall at her, in addition to making inappropriate comments and 
physical contact on a number of occasions.  Id. at 156–57.  Jaudon reported the harassment to 
the director of human resources, consistent with her employer’s sexual harassment policy.  Id.  
The court granted summary judgment to the employer partially on the basis that the 
employer proved the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, which the court asserted as 
sufficient to avoid liability.  Id. at 164.  The court upheld the idea that an employer’s prompt 
remedial action is sufficient to avoid liability based on a factual distinction between the 
Ellerth and Faragher cases and the one at issue.  Id.  The court contrasted the fact that the 
plaintiffs in Ellerth and Faragher had never complained to their employer, while Jaudon 
complained in a timely fashion.  Id. at 164 & n.6.  The court said that the second prong makes 
sense in a situation where an employee delays reporting the harassment, but otherwise it lacks 
“practical application.”  Id. at 164 & n.6. 
131. Indest I, 164 F.3d 258. 
132. Id. at 260. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 264. 
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severe hostile work environment.135 
2. Avoiding Strict Liability 
A second justification for applying a modified Ellerth/Faragher 
defense in certain instances is to avoid imposing strict liability on 
employers.  Some courts contend that applying the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense in single-incident or rapid-onset cases is akin to imposing strict 
liability on the employers.136  These courts argue that the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense always imposes strict liability in supervisory 
harassment cases when an employee reports the harassment because it 
makes the first prong “irrelevant.”137  This implication “truly bother[s]” 
some courts138 and leads these courts to conclude that the Supreme 
Court “could not have meant what it said when it imposed the burden of 
persuasion . . . [of] both prongs . . . on the employer.”139 
The court in McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police140 used the avoidance 
of strict liability justification as an additional reason to grant summary 
judgment to the Arkansas State Police even though McCurdy promptly 
reported the sexual harassment from her supervisor.141  McCurdy argued 
that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense was not available to her 
employer because she had reported the harassment hours after it 
happened.142  The court rejected this argument and said, “McCurdy’s 
argument, when boiled down, leads inevitably to strict liability for the 
[employer],” and noted that this was an unacceptable result based on 
 
135. Id. at 265; see also Marks, supra note 40, at 1425 (arguing that the modified defense 
“is intended to reward diligent employers who have promptly ‘nipped a hostile work 
environment in the bud’—at an ‘incipient’ stage.” (footnotes omitted)).  Although Judge 
Jones’s opinion in Indest I is not binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit or elsewhere, it 
nonetheless led to an “ensuing line of diligent-employer cases.”  Marks, supra note 40, at 
1443–44; see also Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially 
concurring) (“Because [the third panel judge] concurs only in the judgment of this case 
without concurring in Judge Jones’s opinion or mine, neither enjoys a quorum and thus 
neither writing constitutes precedent in this Circuit.”). 
136. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest I, 
164 F.3d at 266. 
137. See Daniel N. Raytis, Note, Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.: Dealing with 
Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 623, 647 (2001). 
138. Marks, supra note 40, at 1426. 
139. Hébert, supra note 23, at 716. 
140. McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762. 
141. Id. at 764. 
142. Id. at 765, 771. 
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Meritor’s prohibition of strict liability for employers.143  The court 
further stated that  
[d]enying such an employer an opportunity to avail itself of the 
affirmative defense, when the employer has done all that an 
employer could reasonably be expected to do to avoid and 
remedy the offending behavior, effectively creates strict liability 
for employers in a [single-incident] case—contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Meritor.144 
In applying this rationale, the courts are attempting to adhere to 
precedent but also trying to stay true to the policy rationale behind 
Meritor.  These courts believe that holding employers strictly liable for 
supervisory harassment even though the employers have seemingly 
done all they could do to avoid the harassment is “wholly contrary to a 
laudable purpose behind limitations on employer liability.”145  
Furthermore, these courts believe that imposing strict liability (or what 
appears to be strict liability) would discourage employers from 
reconciling with their employees and dissuade them from quickly 
correcting harassment in the workplace.146 
3. Desire for Fairness Towards Employers 
Another argument made by courts in favor of applying a modified 
defense in some circumstances is that it is not fair for employers to be 
held liable for supervisory harassment because they are innocent—that 
is, they have done everything in their power to prevent the harassment 
in the first place and remedy it once it comes to their attention.147  These 
 
143. Id. at 771 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71–72 (1986)). 
144. Id. at 772.  The court in Indest I echoed a similar sentiment.  It held that imposing 
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense when an employer has made a “swift and 
appropriate remedial response to the victim’s complaint would thus undermine . . . Meritor.”  
Indest I, 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J.). 
145. Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at 
*5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion).  A district court 
within the Fourth Circuit has gone so far as to describe the Ellerth/Faragher defense as “an 
anathema to this court.”  Corcoran v. Shoney’s Colonial, Inc. 24 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (W.D. 
Va. 1998). 
146. See Watkins, 201 F. 3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16. 
147. See Brian S. Kruse, Note, Strike One–You’re Out! Cautious Employers Lose Under 
New Sexual Harassment Law: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), 78 NEB. 
L. REV. 444, 456–57 (1999) (“[A] vicarious liability standard will work an extremely unfair 
and punitive hardship on employers who proactively and cautiously try to prevent 
harassment. . . .  A faultless employer who in good faith attempts to prevent sexual 
harassment in its workplace is still subject to liability.”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 576 
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courts assert that a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense is appropriate 
when the harassment is sudden and unpreventable.148  As articulated by 
one court: “[I]t seems neither fair to that diligent employer nor 
consistent with the underlying policy of Title VII to have that 
employer’s Title VII liability turn on the alacrity of the complaining 
employee.”149  Instead, in the interest of fairness, these courts want to 
apply a modified defense and hold the employers liable only if they fail 
to do their due diligence in taking remedial action in response to 
reported harassment.150 
As a result, some courts have altered the Ellerth/Faragher defense to 
make employer response a turning point for liability.151  For example, in 
Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Group,152 a general manager of sales 
complained to her employer’s management in October of 1994 that a 
station manager had been sexually harassing her since February of 
1994.153  Although the court ultimately concluded that the incidents did 
 
(recognizing the argument that if employers take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment, 
then they are not wrongdoers for the purposes of Title VII liability and should not be held 
accountable).  Other commentators think that these courts are biased towards employers and 
are using these superficial explanations to hide their true intentions.  Hébert, supra note 23, at 
715 (“[L]ower courts have applied [Ellerth and Faragher] in ways quite hostile to the interests 
of women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests of 
employers.”); Lawton, supra note 15, at 245 (“[D]ecisions [that eliminate the second prong] 
are troubling . . . [because] they reveal a bias in favor of employers.  Courts like Watkins are 
less concerned with the plaintiff’s ability to secure a remedy under Title VII than with what 
they consider a ‘fair’ result for the employer.”); Marks, supra note 40, at 1444, 1454 
(suggesting that “this [Indest I] precedent reflects an outright employer-oriented bias” and 
that this line of cases results in “an overall ‘result-oriented’ bias among judges [because] they 
simply do not want to hold reasonably diligent employers liable.”). 
148. See Marks, supra note 40, at 1425; see, e.g., Watkins, 201 F.3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614 
*1 (holding that the employer had shielded itself from liability for the unavoidable rape 
because it satisfied the first prong of the defense by properly responding to the employee’s 
complaints). 
149. EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5 (D. N. Mar. 
I. Aug. 26, 2011). 
150. See, e.g., Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(Barkett, J., concurring specially). 
151. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004); Van 
Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001); Richardson v. N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 
153 (2d Cir. 1997); Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 237, 252–53 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
152. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x 147. 
153. Id. at 152–53.  The station manager had held her hand, kissed her on the cheek, 
brushed her hair away from her forehead, and repeatedly made unwanted romantic remarks 
to her.  Id. at 152. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 99 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 99 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:59 PM 
2013] FLIRTING WITH THE LAW 189 
not rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment, it 
continued to state that even if these incidents were actionable, the 
employer would be entitled to summary judgment because it took 
“immediate and effective corrective action” after receiving the 
complaint from Van Alstyne.154 
Van Alstyne characterizes the affirmative defense differently than 
originally stated in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth155 and Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton.156  The Van Alstyne court says that an employer is 
entitled to the defense if: 
(1) [T]he supervisor’s harassment did not culminate in a 
“tangible employment action,” and (2) the employer can show 
that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and (a) “the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer 
or to avoid harm otherwise,” or (b) the employee complained 
and the employer took “prompt and appropriate corrective 
action in response to [the] complaint.”157 
Although the court did not fully explain the reasoning behind its 
adoption of this standard, it concluded that the employer was afforded 
 
154. Id. at 153.  Some courts believe that employers should be credited for taking swift 
and appropriate responses to reported harassment, not punished with vicarious liability.  
Cajamarca, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 252–53.  The argument is that employers will have no incentive 
to take remedial responses to reported harassment if doing so is seemingly irrelevant to the 
question of liability.  See id. 
155. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
156. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at 
152. 
157. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at 152 (citation omitted).  In support of this articulation of 
the defense, specifically for subsection (2)(b), the court cites Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 
F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 1997), and Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 
426, 441–43 (2d Cir. 1999).  Id.  Perry was decided in 1997 and references a negligence 
standard that many courts used before the creation of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.  Perry, 
115 F.3d at 153; see also Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in Quid 
Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435, 440 (1997) (“[I]n early Title VII 
sexual harassment cases, . . . the courts determined employer liability by applying 
commonsensical, traditional notions of fault and negligence—an employer would only be 
liable if it caused the harassment at issue or if it negligently failed to remedy the situation 
after it knew of the discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).  Richardson largely discusses the 
negligence standard imposed for co-worker harassment, and in reference to supervisory 
harassment, says “an employer is presumed absolutely liable in cases where the harassment is 
perpetrated by the victim’s supervisor, although employers may interpose an affirmative 
defense to rebut that presumption,” and cites Ellerth and Faragher.  Richardson, 180 F.3d at 
441.  As a result, neither of these cited cases seems to support the modification. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 99 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 99 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:59 PM 
190 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
immunity because it had taken swift action in response to Van Alstyne’s 
complaint of sexual harassment.158  The McCurdy court similarly held 
that the second prong of the defense is inapplicable when the employer 
takes “swift and effective action the minute it learns of a single incident 
of supervisor sexual harassment.”159 
B. Courts That Have Refused to Drop the Second Prong 
Some courts continue to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense in all circumstances without issue.  Thus far, the Tenth Circuit is 
the only federal appeals court to expressly refuse to drop the second 
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in any circumstance,160 but this 
decision has been reflected in concurring and dissenting opinions from 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits161 and has been endorsed by the EEOC.162  
 
158. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at 153.  A judge in another circuit established a similar 
standard in which employer liability revolves around whether the employer took prompt 
remedial action: 
A court’s assessment as to whether a defendant has proved this defense requires, 
first, an analysis of whether the employer has exercised reasonable care in 
preventing sexual harassing behavior.  The court next directs its inquiry to whether 
the employee made reasonably sufficient use of available avenues to put the 
employer on notice of the problem.  Finally, the court refocuses on the employer to 
determine whether the employer or its authorized agent, after receiving notice of 
the harassment, took adequate steps to abate it and prevent its recurrence. 
Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring 
specially).  This concurrence is not controlling precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, but it is 
often cited for its articulation of a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense.  Jeannine Novak, Note, 
“Let’s Be Reasonable”—Resolving the Ambiguities of the Faragher-Ellerth Affirmative 
Defense, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 211, 224 (2001). 
159. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004).  A district court 
case similarly concluded that the issue of employer liability should not come down to when, 
or if, the employee reported the harassment when the plaintiff was a post office worker who 
had been harassed by her supervisor for over a year.  Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 
502, 506, 513 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (“[F]ocusing on the preventative measures an employer has in 
place and the remedial action taken by the employer once it is notified of a problem avoids a 
determination of liability based simply on when the employee reports the harassment.”). 
160. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 248 F.3d 1014, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 2001); Gunnell 
v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998). 
161. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 774–76 (Melloy, J., dissenting); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, 
Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concurring); Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 798 
(5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
162. EEOC, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER 
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter 
EEOC GUIDELINES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.  Another 
source, Cause of Action for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e) with Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defenses, seems to take the same approach as the 
 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 100 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 100 Side A      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:59 PM 
2013] FLIRTING WITH THE LAW 191 
Relevant EEOC Guidelines remark: 
Harassment is the only type of discrimination carried out by a 
supervisor for which an employer can avoid liability, and that 
limitation must be construed narrowly.  The employer will be 
shielded from liability for harassment by a supervisor only if it 
proves that it exercised reasonable care in preventing and 
correcting the harassment and that the employee unreasonably 
failed to avoid all of the harm.  If both parties exercise 
reasonable care, the defense will fail.163 
The courts that refuse to drop the second prong of the defense find 
that even in single-incident or rapid-onset cases where an employer took 
prompt remedial action, an employer will not be shielded from liability 
if the employee reported the harassment.164  Courts justify applying both 
prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense based on its plain language and 
straightforwardness as articulated in the Supreme Court opinions165 and 
because nothing in either case indicated that the defense was to be fact-
specific.166  Additionally, some courts rebut the argument that the 
defense is unfair by reasoning that it can be used to reduce damages.167 
1. Plain Language and Straightforwardness of the Defense 
Courts that apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all 
situations note that doing so is necessary based on the defense’s plain 
 
EEOC, noting that the courts applying a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense have “strangely 
bypassed the second prong, holding that the employer need not prove the second prong of the 
affirmative defense when the first prong is satisfied,” but makes no other comments about it.  
Cause of Action for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e) with 
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defenses, 54 C.O.A. 2d 365 § 37 (Oct. 2012) (citing Jaudon v. 
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000)). 
163. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B. 
164. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1261 (“Under Faragher and . . . [Ellerth], an employer whose 
supervisory personnel has harassed subordinates will be liable for the harassment that 
occurred even though the employer ultimately stopped further harassment.”).  In Gunnell, 
the director of maintenance/custodial services had been making unwanted sexual comments 
to a secretary.  Id. at 1257.  The court remanded the case in light of the standards established 
in Ellerth and Faragher, and advised the lower court that the relevant inquiries were whether 
the employer had a reasonable policy in place to prevent and correct sexual harassment and 
whether the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to take advantage of such policy.  Id. at 1261.  
This approach has been described as the “opposite approach from Indest.”  Novak, supra note 
158, at 225.  See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for more information about Indest 
I’s reasoning. 
165. See infra Part III.B.1. 
166. See infra Part III.B.2. 
167. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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language and straightforwardness.  Because of the plain language of the 
defense, these courts believe that the defense is clear on its face as a 
“remarkably straightforward framework” and thus requires an employer 
to prove both prongs in order to avoid liability for supervisory 
harassment.168  Specifically, courts cite that the defense uses the words 
“necessary” and “and” on its face.169   
The concurring opinion to Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest 
II)170 cited this rationale.  Judge Wiener’s concurring opinion criticized 
Judge Jones’s interpretation of the Ellerth/Fargher defense171 and 
countered that the defense is unambiguous.172  Judge Wiener noted the 
“straight-forward and unqualified bright-line rules” established by the 
Court and emphasized the words “two necessary elements” from the 
defense.173  As the Tenth Circuit has succinctly concluded, “there is no 
reason to believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework 
outlined in Faragher and [Ellerth] does not control all cases in which a 
plaintiff employee seeks to hold his or her employer vicariously liable 
for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.”174  Judge Melloy, the dissenting 
 
168. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Indest II, 
168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring)); see also Chapman v. 
Carmike Cinemas, 307 F. App’x 164, 170 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e continue to require that the 
employer prove the employee did not promptly report the single-incident offense before the 
employer may avail itself of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.”). 
169. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (“The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.” (emphasis added)).  Additionally, some commentators think it is clear that the 
mere availability of an affirmative defense thwarts the argument that employers are held 
strictly liable in instances of supervisory harassment.  Shachter, supra note 104, at 582. 
170. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 795 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
171. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for a description of Judge Jones’s 
lead opinion.  Judge Wiener criticized Judge Jones’s opinion as a substitution of “her own 
balancing test in lieu of the Court’s,” a complete disregard of the two-pronged defense, and 
“as neat an illusion as any sleight-of-hand artist ever created.”  Indest II, 168 F.3d at 798 
(Wiener, J., specially concurring).  Harrison similarly disregards Judge Jones’s reasoning 
because it was written by one judge on a panel of three, another judge on the panel expressly 
rejected it, and the opinion did not have precedential value in the Fifth Circuit.  Harrison, 248 
F.3d at 1025. 
172. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
173. Id. at 800. 
174. Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1026 (citing Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially 
concurring)).  In Harrison, a supervisor in the potash mines harassed the plaintiff by 
repeatedly taking her to isolated areas in the mines, touching her in a sexual manner, and 
forcing her to masturbate him.  Id. at 1016–17.  About two months after the start of the 
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judge in McCurdy, similarly focused on the conjunctive “and” between 
the two prongs of the defense and determined that it was “remarkably 
clear” that both prongs must be applied.175  These opinions found that to 
avoid liability, an employer has to prove both prongs of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all situations.176 
2. Ellerth/Faragher Defense is Not Fact Specific 
The courts in favor of applying both prongs of the defense note that 
nothing in the Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth177 or Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton178 opinions suggest that there are any exceptions to the 
defense’s application regardless of any factual distinctions between 
Ellerth and Faragher and single-incident or rapid-onset cases.179  These 
courts argue that if the Supreme Court had intended to create an 
exception based on factual distinctions, it would have said so in the 
opinions rather than using broad, all-encompassing language in the 
defense.180  Despite factual differences, these courts maintain that the 
defense was created to apply to all instances of supervisory harassment. 
 
harassment, Harrison reported the inappropriate behavior to a manager who took immediate 
action, including separating the two employees; promising to place the supervisor on 
permanent probation for any future, similar behavior; and promising that Harrison would be 
“made whole.”  Id. at 1018.  In court, the defendant attempted to escape vicarious liability for 
the supervisor’s conduct by arguing that Indest I had correctly modified the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense such that employers that take immediate corrective action can avoid liability.  Id. at 
1024.  The court rejected the modified defense from Indest I, noting that the opinion did not 
have precedential value even in the Fifth Circuit, and reiterated the straightforwardness of 
the defense in requiring the application of both prongs.  Id. at 1025–26.  The court affirmed 
the district court’s holding in favor of the plaintiff because the employer failed to fulfill the 
first prong of the defense by not properly disseminating its anti-harassment policy.  Id. at 
1027–28. 
175. See McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J., 
dissenting) (citing Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring)). 
176. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 775 (Melloy, J., dissenting); Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 
(Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
177. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
178. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
179. Commentators have also reflected this idea.  See Shachter, supra note 104, at 583 
(“Simply put, there is no indication that the Supreme Court intended . . . [a] limited scope [of 
the defense].  On the contrary, the affirmative defense reads more like a universal code than 
malleable, context-specific common-law.” (footnote omitted)). 
180. See Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Ind. 2011); 
Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; G. Dain Stewart, Affirmative Defenses—Can an Employer 
Ever Avoid Liability for a Single Act of Sexual Harassment?—Alalade v. AWS Assistance 
Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Ind. 2011), 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 429, 436 (2011) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court did not purposely create exceptions to the applicability of the 
Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong.”). 
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For example, in his concurring opinion in Indest II,181 Judge Wiener 
argued that the Supreme Court crafted the Ellerth/Faragher defense to 
cover “the entire spectrum of an employer’s vicarious liability under 
Title VII for supervisory harassment writ large.”182  While courts that 
have dropped the second prong suggest that the defense was intended to 
cover “some lesser fragment of that statutory problem,” namely ongoing 
harassment only, Judge Wiener found that in neither the Ellerth nor the 
Faragher opinions did the Court “even remotely hint that it is limiting its 
analysis.”183 
Judge Wiener cited the opening language of the Ellerth opinion as 
support for the idea that the defense is all-encompassing: 
We decide whether . . . an employee who refuses unwelcome and 
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no 
adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the 
employer without showing the employer is negligent or 
otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions.184 
Because of the broad and inclusive language from the Court in the 
opening paragraph, the lack of limiting language in the two opinions, 
and the plain language of the two-pronged defense, some courts and 
judges have concluded that they “cannot read anything in 
Ellerth/Faragher that creates an exception to the two prong affirmative 
defense for those cases of single incident harassment that do rise to the 
level of actionable harassment,”185 and have rejected the idea that factual 
distinctions justify modifying the defense.186 
 
181. Indest II, 168 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
182. Id. at 798.  
183. Id.  The Supreme Court recently invoked this consideration in an analogous 
situation.  See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443, 2448 (2013).  In the context of 
the definition of a supervisor, the Court stated that “[t]here is no hint in either Ellerth or 
Faragher that the Court contemplated anything other than a unitary category of supervisors.”  
Id. at 2448.  The Supreme Court seems to be suggesting that if the Court were to limit its 
analysis, or expected a rule to be applied differently from how the Court laid it out, it would 
have said something to that effect within the opinion. 
184. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 799 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746–47 (1998)). 
185. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J., 
dissenting); see, e.g., Indest II, 168 F.3d 795 (Wiener, J., specially concurring); Alalade v. AWS 
Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
186. See supra Part III.B. 
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3. Defense Can Reduce Damages 
Courts in favor of applying both prongs of the defense also reject the 
argument that the Ellerth/Faragher defense is unfair to employers.  
Courts in favor of dropping the second prong argue that the defense, 
when applied in full, is unfair to employers who have done everything in 
their power to prevent and correct harassment because the defense 
nonetheless imputes liability if the employee reported the harassment.187  
However, because the defense was intended to be an “affirmative 
defense to liability or damages,”188 courts applying both prongs of the 
defense counter-argue that the defense is not unfair because an 
employer’s successful fulfillment of the first prong of the defense 
partially mitigates damages imposed on the employer.189 
Therefore, employers still have an incentive to fulfill the first prong 
of the defense to the fullest (preventing and promptly correcting any 
sexual harassment reported to them) in order to mitigate their 
damages.190  Additionally, employers are incentivized to institute formal 
(and effective) reporting policies in the interest of preventing an 
actionable hostile work environment from developing in the first 
place.191  As the EEOC has recognized, “an employer’s quick remedial 
action will often thwart the creation of an unlawful hostile [work] 
environment.”192  In this light, the defense serves Title VII’s deterrent 
 
187. See supra Part III.A.3. 
188. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added); Faragher v. City Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 807 (1998) (emphasis added); Grossman, supra note 87, at 707 (“[T]he best reading of 
these opinions with respect to the affirmative defense is that in some cases the defense should 
avoid liability and in some it should reduce damages.”). 
189. One judge stated, “If a supervisor abuses his authority to commit a sufficiently 
severe act of harassment, the employer’s affirmative defense, if established, should serve to 
reduce the damages, but I don’t understand why it should always erase the tort completely.”  
Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concurring).  Judge 
Melloy agreed that “the taking of prompt and effective remedial action may mitigate 
damages; however, it does not create a complete defense to liability.”  McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 
776 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
190. Lawton, supra note 15, at 207. 
191. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B n.46; Grossman, supra note 87, at 
713 (“[T]he employer will not face liability where it responded promptly and effectively 
because its actions will stymie the maturation of the hostile environment.”).  In addition, 
Judge Melloy believes that the concerns about unfairness are greatly exaggerated, as “many, 
if not [in] most cases, a single incidence of harassment, or . . . incidences that occur over less 
than an hour’s time, will not normally rise to the level of being sufficiently severe and 
pervasive to constitute actionable harassment.”  McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 775 (Melloy, J., 
dissenting). 
192. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B n.46. 
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purpose because the first prong of the defense motivates employers to 
have an effective anti-harassment policy and reporting mechanism that 
“encourage[s] employees to report harassing conduct before it 
[becomes] severe or pervasive.”193  Therefore, some courts believe that 
the defense has a fair and useful purpose for employers, even if it does 
not completely immunize them from liability in some instances.  The 
defense encourages employers to implement effective anti-harassment 
policies, which in turn rewards them by preventing severe actionable 
hostile work environments from occurring.  Additionally, the defense 
works to mitigate damages on the rare occasion that an actionable claim 
does arise. 
C. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corporation 
The Seventh Circuit has not yet voiced its opinion in support of 
either side of the circuit split; however, a district court within the 
Seventh Circuit has recently spoken on the issue in Alalade v. AWS 
Assistance Corp.194  In Alalade, the plaintiff was physically and sexually 
assaulted by her supervisor.195  Four days later, Alalade submitted a 
written complaint to her employer, and as a result, her supervisor was 
terminated.196  Because Alalade promptly reported the harassment, the 
court concluded that the employer could not satisfy the second prong of 
the Ellerth/Faragher defense and denied its motion for summary 
judgment.197 
However, the case did not end there.  Alalade’s employer requested 
that the judge reconsider his denial of summary judgment on the basis 
that other courts had held that employers are not required to satisfy the 
second prong of the defense in all cases.198  Essentially, the employer 
argued that the court should apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense.  
The court acknowledged the existence of the circuit split and found this 
to be a compelling reason to reconsider the denial of AWS’s motion for 
summary judgment.199  The employer in Alalade argued that the 
application of the second prong in this case was inappropriate because it 
 
193. Lawton, supra note 15, at 207 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764). 
194. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
195. Id. at 937; see also supra Part I. 
196. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 938.  The opinion notes that this issue was raised for the first time in the 
motion for reconsideration.  Id. 
199. Id. 
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would result in strict liability for the employer, conflicting with the 
holding from Meritor.200  The court reviewed McCurdy, Indest I, and 
Harrison, which were pertinent to the employer’s arguments.201  Despite 
these arguments and the opinions that supported them, the court upheld 
its previous denial of summary judgment for four main reasons.202 
First, the court said that there is no reason for “single 
instance . . . cases . . . to be treated any differently” than ongoing 
harassment cases.203  The court concluded that Ellerth and Faragher do 
not indicate that single-incident cases are to be treated as an exception, 
stating “[t]he Supreme Court has laid out a simple and easy to apply 
two-part test, and my job [as a judge] is to follow it.”204  Second, the 
Alalade court stated that the defendant’s argument had essentially the 
same force in pervasive cases as in single-incident cases.205  That is, an 
employee’s report of the harassment can prevent the availability of the 
affirmative defense for the employer just as easily in single-incident 
cases as in ongoing cases, so the distinction courts have made between 
these two types of cases is irrelevant.206  And in either situation, the 
existence of the affirmative defense is enough to thwart the argument 
that the court is imposing strict liability on employers.207 
Third, the court concluded that the defendant’s argument would 
“create[] an exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule.”208  The 
defendant argued that it should have to prove only the first prong of the 
defense, because in doing so it has shown that it did everything in its 
power to prevent and correct the harassment—namely, that it had an 
anti-harassment policy in place.209  The court rejected this logic because 
endorsing it would “eviscerate rather than merely modify the rule.”210  
Lastly, the court recognized that limiting the defense to its first prong 
would defeat Title VII’s purpose of mitigating damages and encouraging 
 
200. Id. at 940. 
201. Id. at 940–43. 
202. Id. at 946.  There has been no appeal filed in this case. 
203. Id. at 940; see also Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436 
(noting that “the Supreme Court did not purposely create exceptions to the applicability of 
the Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong”). 
204. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 940. 
205. Id. at 944. 
206. Id. 
207. Stewart, supra note 180, at 436. 
208. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 944–45; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436. 
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198 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
employees to avoid further harm.211  The court also noted that the full 
defense encourages employees to report the harassment early, which 
can prevent a hostile work environment from ever arising.212 
As articulated in Alalade, the Seventh Circuit has yet to address the 
circuit split over the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.213  
Because the application of the defense is a “key issue” in determining 
liability in cases involving supervisor harassment,214 it is an imminent and 
timely problem for the Seventh Circuit to resolve. 
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREDICTIONS 
Despite seeing thirteen supervisory harassment cases over the five-
year period of 1998–2003,215 the Seventh Circuit has yet to choose a side 
in this circuit split.216  As harassment filings continue to rise,217 it is 
increasingly likely that the Seventh Circuit will be faced with this issue 
again in the near future.218  For this reason, practitioners should be 
informed about the split and the stance that the Seventh Circuit is likely 
to take on it. 
In order to make a prediction about how the Seventh Circuit will 
come out on this split, this Comment examines three considerations.  
 
211. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945.  One commentator notes that “the problem with 
dropping the second prong . . . is that it ignores a key player in the harassment context: the 
employee.”  Colin Miller, Everything But the Girl: Northern District of Indiana Opinion 
Sharpens Split over Nature of Affirmative Defense in Single-Instance Harassment Cases, 
FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (July 27, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/07/e
verything-girl-northern-district-indiana-opinion-sharpens-split-nature-affirmative-defense-
single-instance-harassment-cases/. 
212. Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436; Miller, supra note 
211. 
213. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
214. Id. 
215. See supra note 16. 
216. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
217. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
218. The Seventh Circuit must accept all cases that are correctly appealed to it.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); The Appeals Process, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.go
v/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsProcess.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013).  It is more likely that the Seventh Circuit will be faced with this 
issue, see Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, (noting “[t]he large and ever-growing number of appeals”), available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rules/handbook.pdf 11 (2012), before the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari to decide it.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in only seventy-eight cases in 
the 2011–2012 term.  2011 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=11 (last visited Nov. 
23, 2013). 
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First, the Seventh Circuit adheres to precedent and hesitates to deviate 
from Supreme Court precedent without good reason.219  Second, district 
court case law on the split shows that lower courts within the circuit are 
continuing to apply the standard in full.220  Last, this Section argues that 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and rationale in another recent circuit 
split, involving the Vance decision, is readily applicable and informative 
as to how the Seventh Circuit will decide this split.221  This Section 
concludes with a prediction that the Seventh Circuit will reject the 
modified Ellerth/Faragher defense and will apply both prongs of the 
defense in all factual scenarios. 
A. The Seventh Circuit and Precedent 
While a relatively obvious point, consideration should be given to 
the Seventh Circuit’s history of strict adherence to precedent.  Although 
the Supreme Court’s holdings serve as mandatory authority on each of 
the circuits,222 some circuits have found justifications for deviating from 
the precedent established in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth223 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton224 nonetheless.225  However, it seems 
unlikely that the Seventh Circuit will follow in their footsteps.  In Heath 
v. Varity Corp.,226 the Seventh Circuit Court cautioned that “[t]o avoid 
heaping needless costs and delay on the litigants, a district court should 
apply existing precedents while explaining why it believes that 
innovation is in order.  Courts of appeals that believe decisions of the 
Supreme Court to be mistaken are under identical marching orders.”227  
 
219. See infra Part IV.A. 
220. See infra Part IV.B. 
221. See infra Part IV.C. 
222. David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of 
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 87 (1984) (“The proposition that lower 
federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedent evokes little controversy.”).  However, 
Bratz suggests that lower federal courts occasionally find ways to skirt Supreme Court 
precedent, id., a pertinent observation to the issue in this Comment.  
223. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
224. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
225. See supra Part III.A. 
226. Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1995). 
227. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).  Similar to its decision in Heath, the Seventh Circuit 
faithfully followed Supreme Court precedent in Khan v. State Oil Co. (Khan I), 93 F.3d 1358 
(7th Cir. 1996), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan (Khan II), 522 U.S. 3 (1997), even though 
the court thought that the precedent was unsound and inconsistent.  In Khan I, the Court 
followed Supreme Court precedent established in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), 
“despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, [and] moth-eaten foundations.”  Khan I, 93 
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This directive also appears in Gacy v. Welborn,228 where the Seventh 
Circuit noted: “Ours is a hierarchical judiciary, and judges of inferior 
courts must carry out decisions they believe mistaken.”229 
This rationale suggests that the Seventh Circuit would be more likely 
to apply the Ellerth/Faragher defense in its entirety, as that is how the 
Supreme Court established the defense.  If the Seventh Circuit had any 
reservations about the defense’s applicability or conformance with 
precedent, it would follow the defense as established by the Supreme 
Court but may include comments and critiques as dicta, as “[the court is] 
bound to follow a decision of the Supreme Court unless [it is] powerfully 
convinced that the Court would overrule it at the first opportunity.”230  
While the Seventh Circuit should give the “most respectful 
consideration to the decisions of the other courts of appeals,”231 the 
Seventh Circuit will still likely decide to apply both prongs of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense as the Supreme Court drafted it without more 
conclusive evidence that the Court intended to create an exception for 
single-incident cases. 
B. District Courts Within the Seventh Circuit After Ellerth/Faragher 
In the circuits that have decided to drop the second prong of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in some cases, generally the court of appeals of 
that circuit did so first and then district courts followed suit.232  
Additionally, in those instances, the court of appeals made the decision 
 
F.3d at 1363.  Also, the court noted that “the Supreme Court has told the lower federal 
courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a 
decision by the Court; we are leaving the overruling to the Court itself.”  Id.  The Supreme 
Court later commended the Seventh Circuit when it granted certiorari, for this case: “The 
Court of Appeals was correct in applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht, 
for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”  Khan II, 522 U.S. at 
20 (1997). 
228. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993). 
229. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).  
230. Colby v. J. C. Penney, Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987). 
231. Id. 
232. See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(applying a modified defense); Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98–2555, 
1999 WL 1032614 *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion) 
(adopting a modified defense); Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 237 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (adopting Van Alstyne’s modified approach); Yerry v. Pizza Hut of Se. Kan., 
186 F. Supp. 2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting Van Alstyne’s modified approach); Jaudon v. 
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000) (adopting Watkins’s modified 
approach); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (adopting Watkins’s 
modified approach). 
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to drop the second prong soon after the Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth233 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton234 decisions came down.235  
Such patterns are not found within the Seventh Circuit.  While the 
Seventh Circuit has stayed silent on this circuit split, district courts 
within the circuit have overwhelmingly continued to apply both prongs 
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.236  One district court has even advocated 
for the application of both prongs of the defense237 despite a lack of clear 
directive from the Seventh Circuit.  
The first time a district court within the Seventh Circuit encountered 
the issue of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, post-Ellerth 
and Faragher, was in Fall v. Indiana University Board of Trustees.238  Fall 
involved a single incident of severe harassment in which a chancellor of 
a university sexually assaulted an employee in his office.239  Fall reported 
the harassment three months later.240  The court recited the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense exactly as stated by the Supreme Court and 
applied both prongs to the facts at hand.241  The court denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the defendant’s corrective 
opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm.242  Although this case involved 
a single, severe incident of sexual harassment of the kind some courts 
would consider unavoidable by the employer and a case for the 
modified defense, the district court did not hesitate in applying both 
 
233. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
234. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
235. The Ellerth and Faragher cases were decided June 26, 1998.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.  The Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits deviated from the defense 
in 1999.  See, e.g., Watkins, 201 F.3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614; Indest I, 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 
1999); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). 
236. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Dart, No. 10C6569, 2012 WL 6720433 at *6–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
27, 2012); Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *5, *9 (N.D. 
Ill. July 17, 2003); Finnane v. Pentel of Am., Ltd., No. 98C5187, 99C0189, 2000 WL 288437, at 
*10–11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2000). 
237. See Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
238. Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
239. Id. at 873. 
240. Id. at 884. 
241. Id. at 876, 880–84. 
242. Id. at 884.  The court held that because the plaintiff had waited three months before 
reporting the harassment, it was unclear as to whether she had reasonably taken advantage of 
the employer’s reporting mechanisms.  Id.  Ultimately, a jury awarded the plaintiff $800,000 
in punitive damages and $5,157 in compensatory damages.  Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:59 PM 
202 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
prongs of the defense.243 
In a more recent case, the Northern District Court of Illinois applied 
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense to an incident of sexual 
harassment at a sheriff’s office.244  In Stanfield v. Dart,245 a supervisor 
called the plaintiff into his office on four occasions for massages and on 
one of those occasions sexually assaulted her.246  A few months after this 
incident, Stanfield reported the conduct to a sexual harassment 
coordinator who encouraged her to file a written complaint, which she 
did eight months after the supervisor began harassing her.247  The district 
court applied both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in full.248  The 
question of employer liability in this case revolved around the 
application of the second prong—whether the plaintiff had correctly 
utilized her employer’s reporting mechanisms.249  The court stated that a 
plaintiff “satisf[ies] her obligation to avoid the harm” when she 
“adequately alert[s] her employer to the harassment,” which the court 
believed she did in this case by filing a written formal complaint in 
compliance with the employer’s reporting process.250  Again, the district 
 
243. A district court within the Seventh Circuit encountered this issue again in Finnane 
v. Pentel of America, Ltd., No. 98C5187, 99C0189, 2000 WL 288437 *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 
2000).  The court considered whether vicarious liability was appropriate for two instances of 
supervisory harassment consisting of unwanted touching taking place in the same night.  Id. at 
*6.  The court laid out the defense as it was crafted by the Supreme Court and ultimately 
decided that the employer was entitled to the affirmative defense because the employee failed 
to use the employer’s harassment reporting policy.  Id. at *7, *10–11.  Liability in this case 
revolved around the application of the second prong; however, the court applied both prongs 
of the defense and did not mention the possibility of a modified defense in which the second 
prong was inapplicable.  Id. at *10–11. 
244. Stanfield v. Dart, No. 10 C 6569, 2012 WL 6720433, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 
2012). 
245. Stanfield, 2012 WL 6720433, at *1. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at *1–2. 
248. Id. at *5–10. 
249. Id. at *8–9. 
250. Id. at *9.  Although waiting an extended of period of time before filing a complaint 
can sometimes constitute an unreasonable delay in reporting, in this case the employer’s 
harassment policy gave victims 365 days to file a report, so Stanfield’s complaint eight months 
after the first incident was within that window.  Id. at *2, *9.  In a contrasting case, a district 
court from the Seventh Circuit held in Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chicago, that the 
employer was entitled to the affirmative defense after an employee reported receiving 
sexually explicit phone calls from her supervisor on two occasions.  Mueller v. McGrath 
Lexus of Chi., No. 02C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *2, *10 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2003).  The 
employee reported the harassment, leading the employer to meet with the harasser and 
institute a “zero tolerance policy” after which the harassment ceased, but the victimized 
employee quit a few months later.  Id. at *2–4 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
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court did not question the use of both prongs of the defense and 
emphasized that an employee’s report of harassment was enough to 
satisfy the second prong. 
Therefore, the only district court case from the Seventh Circuit that 
has directly addressed the circuit split over the second prong of the 
defense is Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.251  The other district court 
opinions from this circuit that have encountered the issue of vicarious 
liability in single-incident cases have applied both prongs of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense without questioning the defense’s fairness or 
applicability.  This pattern may be persuasive for the Seventh Circuit 
when it first faces this issue.252  It may also be relevant that the Seventh 
Circuit has remained silent on this issue up until this point.  This silence 
could be implicit approval of the district court’s application of applying 
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all instances. 
C. Analogy to the Recently Resolved Split in Vance v. Ball State 
University 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on another circuit split 
regarding the Ellerth/Faragher defense: the split over the definition of 
supervisor.  The Circuit’s reasoning in that split provides some guidance 
as to how the Seventh Circuit would resolve the circuit split over the 
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.  Regarding the recently 
resolved circuit split, the Seventh Circuit determined the definition of 
 
applied the second prong of the defense and held that the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of her employer’s corrective opportunities by quitting her job; thus, the 
employer was not liable.  Id. at *7, *9–10.  Although this court applied the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense as a complete defense to liability, the Supreme Court designed the defense to be a 
“defense to liability or damages.”  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).  It appears that Mueller would have 
been an appropriate case for the affirmative defense to limit damages but not function as a 
complete bar to liability.  The court could have awarded the plaintiff damages for the sex 
harassment, as she immediately reported it, thus fulfilling the second prong of the defense.  
One commentator suggests that using the defense as a complete bar to liability in all 
situations is a way for lower courts to appear as if they are applying the full defense while 
actually subtly modifying it.  See Novak, supra note 158, at 223–24.  It is unclear whether this 
was the court’s intention in Mueller. 
251. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011); see also 
supra Part III.C. 
252. Similarly, the district court’s opinion in Keefer likely influenced the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in McCurdy.  See supra notes 112, 116, 126–28 and accompanying text.  This may also 
come to be the case in the Ninth Circuit where the district court’s opinion in Asia Pacific 
Hotels could influence the court of appeals in the future.  See EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., 
No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601 (D. N. Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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supervisor by looking both to the plain language and intent of Title VII, 
but also to Title VII’s practical purposes and the interpreting case law.253  
Applying that same logic to this circuit split over the application of the 
affirmative defense in single-incident cases, it is likely that the Seventh 
Circuit would come out in favor of applying the defense in its entirety in 
order to stay true to the spirit behind the harassment laws. 
Until June of 2013, a disagreement regarding the proper definition 
of “supervisor” for the purposes of Title VII was splitting the courts.  
Whether a harassing employee is a supervisor or not is a crucial 
distinction for the purposes of determining employer liability.254  If a 
supervisor committed the harassment, the employer can avoid liability 
only by proving both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.255  If the 
harasser was a co-worker, the employee can prevail by showing that the 
employer was negligent in preventing the harassment.256  Thus, a court’s 
interpretation of the definition of supervisor can greatly affect the 
outcome of a case.257 
Before the Supreme Court clarified the split in its most recent term, 
courts generally took one of two approaches to the definition of 
supervisor.  The more defined approach was that an employee is a 
supervisor if he or she “has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, 
transfer, or discipline the victim.”258  The more “open-ended” definition 
was that a person is a supervisor if he or she has the power to direct 
another’s daily activities.259  The Seventh Circuit fell into the former 
group, the definition that was ultimately upheld by the Supreme 
Court.260 
The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that an employee is a 
supervisor only if that person had the power to “directly affect the terms 
and conditions” of other employees’ work.261  Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
generally deems a person a supervisor if that person has the authority to 
 
253. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011). 
254. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. See id.; Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998). 
258. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
259. Id. at 2443. 
260. Id. at 2439. 
261. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Parkins, 163 
F.3d at 1034). 
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“hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”262  The 
Seventh Circuit made this final determination on the definition of 
supervisor by looking at the plain language of Title VII, the inherent 
meaning behind Title VII, and the relevant interpreting case law.263  
Although the definition of supervisor is not laid out in Title VII, the 
Seventh Circuit in Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc.264 
discerned its meaning by examining the underlying purposes and policy 
guiding Title VII.265  The court recognized that heightened employer 
liability exists for supervisory harassment because the employer has 
entrusted the supervisor with more power than the average employee.266  
For that reason, it was clear to the court that “the touchstone for 
determining supervisory status is the extent of authority possessed by 
the purported supervisor” and that authority is explicit when the 
employee can “affect the terms and conditions” of others’ 
employment.267 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision on the supervisor circuit split has 
similarities to the split currently at issue over the second prong of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense.  Its ultimate decision and corresponding 
rationale in the resolved split suggest that the Seventh Circuit would 
side with the courts that refuse to drop the second prong in any 
circumstances.  In the supervisor split, the term at issue was not 
explicitly defined.  Therefore, the court had to determine the relative 
importance of available sources.  The court chose to look closely at the 
plain language of Title VII, the policies guiding it, the common law of 
agency that inspired it, and the case law—Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth268 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton269—that interpreted it.270  
 
262. Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002). 
263. See Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032–33. 
264. Parkins, 163 F.3d 1027. 
265. Id. at 1033. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 1033–34.  The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s approach.  Vance 
v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).  The Court emphasized that the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense was crafted to be “workable,” and adopting the more liberal definition of supervisor 
would be “murky” and be difficult to consistently apply.  Id. at 2448–49.  The Court also 
noted that the Ellerth/Faragher defense was designed to appropriately and fairly take into 
account the interests of both the employer and the employee, which the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition did more effectively than the competing approach.  Id. at 2444. 
268. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
269. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
270. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033. 
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court imputes heightened 
liability on employers in supervisory harassment cases under the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense because the law of agency suggests that the tort 
of harassment is aided by the employer’s decision to place him in a 
position of authority.271  The Seventh Circuit strove to stay true to the 
spirit of that law behind Title VII and held that a person must truly be in 
a position to be aided by his status in order to be a supervisor; that is, he 
must have the heightened powers that a supervisor generally has.272 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit will likely use the spirit and principles 
behind Title VII and the interpreting case law to make a conclusive 
decision on the circuit split here.  Ellerth and Faragher are silent as to 
whether the affirmative defense excludes single-incident cases of 
harassment.273  The Seventh Circuit should accordingly interpret the rule 
in light of the plain language and spirit that inspired Title VII and the 
defense and the interpreting case law.274  The Seventh Circuit has yet to 
decide one way or the other on the circuit split, so it may first look to 
district court opinions for guidance.275  But even if the court of appeals 
does not accord value to the district court opinions, the plain language 
and spirit inspiring Title VII and the affirmative defense should appear 
clear to the Seventh Circuit.  The rule uses the word “and” between its 
two prongs and strives to represent a workable balance between the 
interests of the employer and the employee.276 
Interpreting the rule differently in single-incident cases of 
harassment would be completely contrary to the plain language of the 
defense and the intent of Title VII.  The Seventh Circuit would have to 
reject the policy inspiring Title VII and affirmatively state that the 
interests of the employer are superior to the interests of the employee in 
single incidents of harassment in order to find that the second prong 
should be dropped.  Given the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in the 
supervisor split, it is unlikely that the Seventh Circuit would be willing 
to completely reject both the plain language and spirit of the law to hold 
that there is a separate standard for single incidents of harassment. 
 
271. Id. 
272. See id. at 1033–34. 
273. See supra Parts II.B, III. 
274. See, e.g., Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033. 
275. See supra Part IV.B. 
276. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2444 (2013); 
Shachter, supra note 104, at 582. 
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D. Predictions 
Based on these factors, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit will side 
with the Tenth Circuit in this split and apply both prongs of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all relevant cases.  The three main 
arguments advocated by courts in favor of dropping the second prong in 
select cases are: fairness to employers,277 adherence with Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson’s278 prohibition of strict liability,279 and the factual 
distinctions from the Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth280 and Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton281 cases.282  However, it is unlikely that the Seventh 
Circuit will find these arguments persuasive and instead will find that 
the defense, as crafted by the Supreme Court, is binding precedent to be 
followed in all cases. 
First, the Seventh Circuit has come out in favor of adhering to 
Supreme Court precedent unless it is absolutely sure that the Supreme 
Court would overrule its own holding if given the chance.283  That finding 
is not apparent in this split.  Second, the circuit should look to various 
district court holdings on this issue.  The circuit will find that, uniformly, 
district courts within the Seventh Circuit have continued to apply both 
prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense as articulated by the Supreme 
Court.284  In fact, the court in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.285 has 
expressly stated that applying both prongs of the defense is the proper 
outcome.  Third, as evidenced by the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in 
Vance v. Ball State University286 and the preceding cases that interpreted 
the definition of supervisor, the circuit will first likely examine the plain 
language and reasoning behind the rule.  As the rule is clear, containing 
the words “and” and “necessary,” it would be unusual for the circuit to 
find that there should be a modified affirmative defense in different 
factual scenarios.  Additionally, the circuit will look to the underlying 
policy and spirit behind the rule.  Because the Supreme Court created 
the defense in order to promote reasonableness on behalf of the 
 
277. See supra Part III.A.3. 
278. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
279. See supra Part III.A.2. 
280. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742. 
281. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775. 
282. See supra Part III.A.1. 
283. See supra Part IV.A. 
284. See supra Part IV.A. 
285. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
286. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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employer and the employee, the circuit should not deviate from this 
precedent in order to create an alternative, more “fair” rule for 
employers. 
V. WHAT SHOULD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DO? 
The Seventh Circuit should continue to apply both prongs of the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all instances of supervisory harassment.  
First, as the Supreme Court has noted, the rule provides a proper 
balance between the interests of the employer and the employee.287  The 
employer is able to avoid strict liability per Meritor Savings Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson288 purely by the existence of the defense.289  The defense 
recognizes that employers do not want to be liable for their supervisor’s 
harassment of which they have no control over.  However, this must be 
balanced with the fact that the employee wants, and needs, retribution 
for his or her harm.  Additionally, the employee wants his or her 
employer to exercise caution when placing people in positions of 
authority and to continually oversee what is happening in its 
workplaces.  Based on these considerations, the Court created the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense in order to promote reasonableness and 
responsibility on the part of both the employer and employee.290  The 
employer must have anti-harassment policies and procedures in place, 
but at the same time, employees must timely report harassment if it 
happens to them.  The expectations placed on employees under this 
defense are in part inspired by the tort of avoidable consequences,291 but 
ultimately work to benefit the employer as well.  An employee should 
not be able to hold his or her employer liable for supervisory 
harassment that continued for an extended period of time if the 
employer was never put on notice of the harassment—this is why the 
defense requires employee reporting under the second prong.  
Therefore, the defense, as crafted, adequately represents both the 
interests of the employer and employee. 
Second, if the Seventh Circuit adopted a separate rule in single-
incident supervisory harassment cases, it would go against the Supreme 
 
287. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443–44 (2013). 
288. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
289. As one commentator noted: “[T]he Ellerth majority designed the affirmative 
defense within the parameters of the Meritor precedent.  Moreover, the affirmative defense, 
by nature, erects a barrier to strict liability.”  Shachter, supra note 104, at 582. 
290. See supra notes 63–67, 90–97 and accompanying text. 
291. Murr, supra note 87, at 609–11. 
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Court’s desire to have a workable standard that could be “readily 
applied” in cases of employer liability.292  Implementing separate 
standards in single-incident cases presents the problem of determining 
which standard to apply, and when.  In some cases it may be clear when 
harassment is confined to a single incident, such as a rape that occurred 
one time.  However, courts have already begun to blur the line between 
what is literally a single incident and what can be generalized as a single 
incident.293  This extension of a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense into 
cases that are not obviously single incidents is disturbing in that the 
practice suggests that courts may begin to abandon the second prong 
altogether.  This is a slippery slope, one that the Seventh Circuit should 
avoid at all costs.294 
Third, the second prong of the defense serves as a useful check on 
the first prong—the existence of an anti-harassment policy.  In recent 
times, most employers are smart enough to have an anti-harassment 
policy in place; however, in reality the policy may be useless.  For 
example, a policy may exist but may not be distributed or accessible to 
all employees, or the policy may provide only one illogical method of 
reporting harassment.295  In these cases, if the employer invokes the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense, the employer may be able to prove the first 
and second prong.  However, in response to the second prong, the 
employee-victim will be able to raise issues relating to the deficiency of 
the reporting mechanism.  In that way, the second prong serves as a 
check on the practicality of the anti-harassment policy and brings these 
issues to the forefront in court.  A policy may look good on paper, and 
 
292. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449. 
293. See supra note 112; see also infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
294. Additionally, there is support for the argument that the second prong of the 
defense functions exactly the same in both single-incident and ongoing cases and that an 
endorsement to drop the prong in some cases is an endorsement to drop the prong in all 
cases.  The court in Alalade noted that regardless of whether harassment is ongoing or 
confined to a single incident, an employee’s “quick action prevents the employer from 
satisfying Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong.”  Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 
2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011).  The court argued that the application of a modified defense 
“creates an exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule. . . .  [T]he reasoning endorsed 
by [the employer] actually supports dropping the second prong altogether whenever the 
employer satisfies the first prong.”  Id. 
295. As was the case in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the employer had an anti-
harassment policy, but it was not distributed to all employees.  Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998).  Another example of a policy being unusable would be 
where the policy requires reporting to the company’s human resources manager, but that 
manager is the one committing the harassment. 
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may even pass the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, but the 
existence of the second prong gives the employee an opportunity to 
show the court that the policy was insufficient.  This alone is a worthy 
purpose of the second prong. 
Fourth, the bottom-line is that the burden and cost of the 
supervisory harassment tort should fall on the employer rather than on 
the employee.  If the defense works out perfectly, wherein each party 
does their respective duty, the defense is clear that the employer 
remains responsible.296  Some courts fear that this is unfair to 
employers—they argue that an employer should not be liable merely 
because an employee reports the harassment.297  However, there are 
many reasons why this result is nonetheless appropriate and reasonable.  
The employer made the decision to promote the person to the position 
of supervisor in the first place,298 in order to act vicariously on the part of 
the employer.299  Being a supervisor comes with power.  Employers need 
to recognize that fact and exercise caution when hiring supervisors.  
Employers should also continually do their due diligence to oversee how 
their supervisors function in the workplace, both through the 
supervisor’s professional work and through their interactions with 
employees.  Additionally, an employer can much more easily bear the 
cost of the tort (payment to the plaintiff) than the victim, who will be 
forced to suffer her harm without reparation.300  It is the cost of doing 
business—employers should be responsible for any harm that they 
 
296. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 717; Shachter, supra note 104, at 582. 
297. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 
1032614, at *5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); EEOC 
v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5 (D. N. Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011); 
Lawton, supra note 15, at 245. 
298. Hébert, supra note 23, at 717 (noting that it was the choice of the employer to “put 
a sexual harasser in a position of authority that facilitated the harassment”). 
299. Grover notes: “In most discrimination cases, supervisors are quintessentially agents 
of the employer; a supervisor who discriminates in the course of taking an employment action 
that is his or her job to take, is necessarily operating as the agent of the employer.”  Susan 
Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual Harassment Analysis, 35 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 810 (2002). 
300. See Garrison, supra note 113, at 1152 (citing Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 
7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 757 (1999)) (recognizing “Title VII’s policy of allowing 
recovery from the ‘deep[er]-pocket[ed]’ employer”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 583–84 
(“[E]mployers should be viewed as . . . the superior spreader or insurer of the costs of 
discrimination . . . [and] the employer is in the superior position to . . . spread the risk more 
evenly across society.”(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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directly, or indirectly, cause.301 
Hence, courts that apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in 
certain situations are ignoring the plain language and intent of the rule 
at the expense of the innocent employee-victims.  Employees deserve to 
be protected in their workplaces, and the reality is that sometimes a 
mere anti-harassment policy does not ensure this protection.  Employers 
need to be responsible for whom they promote to the position of 
supervisor and be knowledgeable about what is happening in their 
workplaces.  The Seventh Circuit should examine the spirit and policy 
considerations behind Title VII and recognize that the Supreme Court 
acknowledged all of the arguments offered by courts who dropped the 
second prong, yet the Court chose to reject them all in favor of crafting 
a straightforward standard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In creating the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the Supreme 
Court wanted to avoid imposing strict liability on employers while still 
requiring more than the negligence standard that courts had been 
employing.  Some courts are not satisfied with this defense, arguing that 
in single-instance cases it fails to avoid strict liability and is unfair to 
employers.302  Since the modified Ellerth/Faragher defense appeared in 
single-instance cases, some courts have traveled down the slippery slope 
and expanded the rationale even further to rapid-onset, incipient,303 and 
even ongoing cases.304  Other courts and circuits have rejected this 
 
301. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (“[O]ne might justify 
the assignment of the burden of the untoward behavior to the employer as one of the costs of 
doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather than the victim.”); Harper & Flynn, 
supra note 57, at 253; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500 (1961). 
302. See supra Parts III.A.2–3. 
303. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
304. See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff 
was harassed for eight months and reported the harassment, but employer was entitled 
immunity because it took swift action in responding to the plaintiff’s complaint); Coates v. 
Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1362–63, 1367–69 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring 
specially) (plaintiff suffered harassment for over a year, but the concurring judge advocated 
for a modified defense); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 157, 164 (D. Md. 
2000) (plaintiff suffered inappropriate comments and physical contact on a number of 
occasions, but employer was immune from liability for taking prompt remedial action upon 
plaintiff’s complaint); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (plaintiff 
was harassed for over a year, but the employer could avail itself of the defense because it 
promptly responded to the harassment). 
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modified defense, instead holding that the Supreme Court was clear in 
crafting a defense that considered the interests of the employer and 
employee and which was intended to apply in all cases.305  The Seventh 
Circuit has not yet voiced its opinion in support of either side.306 
Overall, it is more likely that the Seventh Circuit will side with the 
Tenth Circuit in applying both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense 
than with courts such as the Eighth and Fifth Circuits in dropping the 
second prong in certain cases.  First, the Seventh Circuit is reluctant to 
deviate from precedent unless there is a clear reason to do so.307  The 
Supreme Court has established precedent in the Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth308 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton309 cases, and unless 
the Seventh Circuit is willing to completely disregard the plain language 
and intent of the rule, it will likely apply both prongs of the rule going 
forward.  Second, the circuit may look to district courts’ decisions 
following the appearance of the split.  District courts within the Seventh 
Circuit have consistently continued to apply both prongs of the defense, 
with one court in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.310 explicitly 
addressing the issue and arguing that all courts should be applying both 
prongs of the defense.  Third, an analogy to another circuit split 
regarding sex harassment law suggests that the Seventh Circuit will look 
to the plain language of the rule and Title VII as well as invoking the 
policy and meaning behind them.  For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit 
will likely come out in support of courts that have refused to drop the 
second prong in single-incident cases. 
This conclusion is the right conclusion.  The defense adequately 
balances the interests of the employer versus the employee and comes 
out appropriately in favor of the employee when both parties act 
responsibly.311  The burden of the tort should not fall on the innocent 
 
305. See supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
306. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 938 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
307. See supra Part IV.A. 
308. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
309. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
310. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d 936. 
311. See Grossman, supra note 87, at 708 (“Applied correctly, the Faragher and Ellerth 
rule should result in vicarious liability for the employer under some circumstances (a single, 
severe act of harassment) regardless of the fact that the employer may have responded 
adequately to stop the harassment and prevent further occurrences.”); Hébert, supra note 23, 
at 717 (“[The defense is] the appropriate allocation of liability between an employee who has 
been sexually harassed and the employer who has put a sexual harasser in a position of 
authority that facilitated the harassment.”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 582 (“[T]he 
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employee, especially when the employer is not really innocent.  The 
employer hired the offender and made that individual a supervisor—the 
employer needs to be accountable for that.  Additionally, the standard, 
as defined in Ellerth and Faragher, is easily applicable.  If the Seventh 
Circuit were to begin applying different standards depending on 
different factual situations, it will inevitably run into a problem other 
courts are facing: what exactly is a single incident of harassment, and 
how is it recognized?  Harassment is harassment, whether it happens 
one time or many times, and employers have to take responsibility for 
harassment when it takes place in their workplaces.  The Seventh Circuit 
needs to promote this responsibility by refusing to drop the second 
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident cases so that 
employees like Ms. Alalade do not continue to feel as if they are being 
victimized by both their supervisor and their employer. 
NATALIE S. NEALS* 
 
affirmative defense enables an employee’s reasonable behavior (satisfaction of the second 
prong) to trump an employer’s reasonable behavior (satisfaction of the first prong), resulting 
in employer liability.”). 
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